· Written by Ken Fuller
· Tuesday, 06 June 2017 00:00
· Daily Tribune
Douglas MacArthur’s eagerness to liberate the islands which had so far been by-passed may be partly explained by the fact that, according to his biographer Dorris Clayton James, “Roxas’ faction was exceedingly anxious to have the congressional representatives from the south liberated so that a quorum would not be lacking in the Philippine Senate and House at the June session.”
On June 8, 1945, MacArthur paid a personal visit to the penal colony on Palawan to hold discussions with some of his pre-war political contacts who were now held as collaborators. It may be significant that this was one day before Congress was summoned; of the 98 representatives, 70 were present, eleven were dead and 17 were still detained; of the 24 senators, only 13 were present, two were dead, two had still not arrived in Manila and seven were detained.
Despite the fact that Congress was thus short of a quorum, Manuel Roxas, MacArthur’s presidential candidate, was elected president of the Senate and chairman of the powerful committee on appointments.
The Philippine Trade Bill would require the Philippines to amend its Constitution to concede equal rights — “parity” — to United States’ citizens and corporations with regard to the ownership and exploitation of natural resources and utilities; under the Tydings-McDuffie Act, “parity” had been envisaged only for the Commonwealth period.
This new Act was sponsored by Paul McNutt, the last High Commissioner and the first US Ambassador to the Philippines. According to Senator Millard Tydings in evidence to the US House Ways and Means Committee in March 1946, McNutt was “opposed to Philippine independence, and if you would ask him he would tell you so. The truth of the matter is that most of the people, outside the Filipinos, who favor this bill are fundamentally opposed to Philippine independence... Their whole philosophy is to keep the Philippines economically even though we lose them politically.”
When McNutt traveled to Washington in February 1946 in order to lobby for the Bill, he made clear his view that the collaboration issue was for the Filipinos to decide. In his briefcase at the time, however, was the confidential report by Walter Hutchinson of the Attorney-General’s office which recommended that Washington should take action against those high-ranking Filipinos, including Roxas, who had signed the declaration of war against the USA.
According to Hernando Abaya, although the Trade Bill was redrafted four times, this redrafting was directed by McNutt and his supporters.
Like many wealthy Americans with an involvement in policy matters in the Philippines, McNutt was further enriched in the process.In 1948 he started an insurance company with just P50,000. By 1966 the company reported total assets of P270 million. Together with two sister-companies, it would represent the interests of US businessman C. V. Starr. Clearly, “parity” worked rather well for Paul McNutt.
The Trade Act would be underpinned by the Philippine Rehabilitation Act, under the terms of which $625 million would be paid by the United States in war damages — but no payment of over $500 would be made unless “parity” had been agreed.
The provisions of the Act would prove to be a major issue in the elections set for April 1946. Roxas, as might be expected, favored the Bill, while Sergio Osmeña opposed the “parity” provisions. Roxas therefore led a breakaway from the Nacionalista Party — the Liberal Party.
During the election campaign the Military Police was given a free hand to support Roxas in Central Luzon. In Nueva Ecija, the MP garrisons were strengthened to 2,000 men. Meetings were fired upon and homes searched. The offices of the progressive Democratic Alliance (DA) were raided and equipment smashed. On the eve of the poll, the chairman of the Pampanga DA and his son were both kidnapped and killed.
In the April 1946 elections the DA contested one-fifth of the congressional seats and won 152,361 (six percent) of the votes cast, electing six representatives in Central Luzon and one Nacionalista, giving Osmeña a clear majority in the region.
Nationally, however, Roxas won the day, although he now had a problem: The Bell Trade Act required an amendment to the Philippine Constitution, something which could only be effected by an affirmative vote of three-quarters of the members of both Houses. Thus, to be lawful the amendment should have received the votes of 18 of the 24 senators and 73 of the 98 Representatives.
However, Roxas suspended the successful DA and Nacionalista candidates from Central Luzon on the grounds that their elections had been characterized by the absence of peace and stability.
In the Senate, Roxas allowed senators who had been indicted by the People’s Court for collaboration to take their seats, while suspending three opposition senators for alleged electoral irregularities. Although in law only the Electoral Tribunal could deprive the suspended members of their votes, the Liberal Party majority ruled that their votes should not be counted. This meant that the constitutional amendment could now be passed on the affirmative vote of 68 Representatives and 16 Senators — which, to the very vote, it was.
This was US electoral interference at work.
The Filipino flag that revolutionary general Emilio Aguinaldo handed over to Roxas at the “independence” ceremony on July 4, 1946 was the same one that the revolutionary veteran had presented to Jose P. Laurel when the Japanese had granted “independence” in 1943.
Here, in symbolic form, was illustrated the reasoning of the USA in dealing so lightly with the collaborators: Most of those officials who had betrayed their country to the Japanese could be relied upon to betray it all over again to US capital.
